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Autoworker Daniel Duffey, an employee of General Motors Cor-
poration (GM), took advantage of GM's Employee Assistance Program
(EAP), which "provides counseling and related services for employees
with problems such as those stemming from alcohol and drug abuse."'
As a participant in the program, Daniel revealed his status as a sub-
stance abuser. GM subsequently discharged him. When he filed a griev-
ance protesting the discharge, allegations relating to his participation in
the EAP began to circulate, despite previous written assurances of con-
fidentiality. He sued GM, alleging violations of state privacy and con-
tract laws. GM removed the case to a federal court, which dismissed
Daniel's claims as preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).2 According to the court, Daniel was required to
proceed on a federal cause of action or none at all Did Congress in-
tend for Daniel to lose his state claims? If so, did Congress want him to
have a federal cause of action, and under what circumstances?
Because ERISA broadly preempts many state privacy remedies
without creating any of its own, parties like Daniel were left without
any recourse for privacy violations. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)' to
protect individually identifiable health information.! As Daniel's case
illustrates, one way to increase the protection of private health infor-
mation would be to allow individual civil suits against violators of pri-
vacy rules like those established by HIPAA. However, HIPAA itself
and the regulations adopted to implement its privacy protection con-
tain no explicit private right of action, and courts have refused to infer
a private cause of action under HIPAA for privacy violations.6
t B.M. 2002, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
1 This scenario is based on the facts and holding of In re General Motors Corp, 3 F3d 980,
982 (6th Cir 1993).
2 29 USC § 1001 et seq (2000).
3 General Motors, 3 F3d at 985.
4 Pub Law No 104-191,110 Stat 1936 (1996).
5 See Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 CFR §§ 164.501-164.534 (2004).
6 See, for example, University of Colorado Hospital Authority v Denver Publishing Co, 340
F Supp 2d 1142,1145 (D Colo 2004) ("[L]egal commentators appear to unanimously assume that
there is no private right of action under HIPAA, including to enforce the 'privacy rule' of
§ 1320d-6."). See also Franqoise Gilbert, Emerging Issues in Global AIDS Policy: Preserving
Privacy, 25 Whittier L Rev 273, 289 (2003); Frederick Y. Yu, Medical Information Privacy Under
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Another possible route for a private right of action for certain
plaintiffs-if such an action should exist-could look to the intersec-
tion of HIPAA and ERISA. HIPAA requires ERISA plans to comply
with HIPAA's privacy rules and to amend or produce compliant
documents Thus, victims of privacy violations related to their
ERISA-regulated healthcare plans could conceivably sue to enforce
the privacy rules as "terms of the plan" under § 502(a) of ERISA.9
This Comment discusses whether, despite the lack of a private
cause of action under HIPAA itself, a private cause of action should
be recognized under ERISA for HIPAA privacy-rule violations-
whether such a cause of action is supported by the statutory language
and legislative intent of both statutes, and if so, where it would origi-
nate. In doing so, the Comment addresses whether granting such a
cause of action undermines the system of privacy regulations codified
by HIPAA.
Part I gives a brief overview of both the HIPAA privacy rules and
the ERISA private enforcement scheme. Part II addresses whether
Congress intended to create any of the aforementioned private causes
of action, and if so, which among them? In particular, Part II explores
whether the statutory language and legislative history of ERISA and
HIPAA support ERISA enforcement of HIPAA privacy rules. Part III
first discusses statutory remedies generally and then explores the pos-
sibility that "terms of the plan" can come from sources other than the
standard plan documents. Particularly, Part III examines whether
ERISA document changes or additions enacted pursuant to HIPAA
may embody terms of the plan. Finally, Part III explores whether pri-
HIPAA:A Practical Guide, Colorado Lawyer 11, 22 (May 2003); Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State
Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 Yale J Health Policy L
& Ethics 327, 343 (2002). For cases rejecting an independent private cause of action under a
different section of HIPAA, see Northwestern Memorial Hospital v Village of South Chicago
Heights Health & Welfare Fund, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 14411, *10 (ND Ill); O'Donnell v Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 173 F Supp 2d 1176, 1179-80 (D Wyo 2001); Brock v Provident
America Insurance Co, 144 F Supp 2d 652,657 (ND Tex 2001).
7 HIPAA affects all ERISA plans that provide or pay for the cost of medical care, except self-
insured plans that are administered by a sole employer and have fewer than fifty participants 45 CFR
§§ 160.103. See also Covered Entity Decision Tools: Is a Private Benefit Plan a Health Plan? online at
http../www.cmhhsgov/hipaa/hipaa2/support/tools/decisionsupport/xmidecision.asp?decision=D3
(visited Aug 17,2005). Other covered entities include health insurance issuers, HMOs, and health care
providers. Id at http://www.cmsihhsgov/hipaa/hipaa2/support/tools/decisionsupport/default.asp (visited
Aug 17, 2005).
8 "Terms of the plan" is not defined by the statute, but courts generally interpret it to
mean those rights and benefits conferred on participants as specified in the plan documents. See
Part II.B.
9 The most commonly used ERISA private remedies, § 502(a)(1)(B), codified at 29 USC
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), and its equitable companion, § 502(a)(3), codified at 29 USC § 1132(a)(3), give
participants and beneficiaries a private cause of action to recover benefits due or to enforce their
rights under the terms of the plan.
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vacy-rule plaintiffs can bring ERISA actions for breach of fiduciary
duty. Ultimately, the Comment concludes that, despite the lack of any
explicit manifestation of Congress's intent to create an ERISA cause
of action for HIPAA privacy-rule violations, the statutes interact in a
way that implies such intent.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF HIPAA AND ERISA
The purpose of ERISA is to protect employees; the purpose of
HIPAA is to protect individuals' health information. As they are writ-
ten, ERISA and HIPAA might interact in such a way that employees
may sue for unauthorized use of their health records. This Part provides
background on ERISA, HIPAA, and their interaction. Part L.A focuses
on the privacy rules-what they are, whom they affect, and how they
are enforced. It also discusses the elements of HIPAA that are possible
candidates for ERISA enforcement-the amendments regarding dis-
closure to plan sponsors and the privacy notice. Part I.B discusses
ERISA, its written requirement, and how it generally preempts state-
law privacy claims without creating any privacy rights of its own.
A. HIPAA
Although HIPAA's principal purpose is to increase access to
healthcare through expanded portability and renewability of insur-
ance,'° HIPAA also governs the use of individually identifiable health
information." Its regulations took effect on April 14, 20032 (April 14,
2004, for smaller health plans13).
1. Privacy rules.
HIPAA's privacy rules are the primary means of federal regula-
tion of health privacy." The privacy rules were issued by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) under his rulemaking author-
ity.'" These rules provide individuals with new rights and regulate the
10 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, HR Rep No 104-496,104th
Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 USCCAN 1865 (reporting that HIPAA was enacted to
"improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage").
11 See 45 CFR § 164.501-164.534 (2004).
12 See id § 164.534.
13 Smaller health plans include those with annual receipts of $5 million or less. 45 CFR
§ 160.103 (2004).
14 45 CFR §§ 164.500-164.534 (creating national standards regarding the confidentiality of
individuals' medical records and other personal health information).
15 The Secretary's rulemaking authority was pursuant to Subtitle F, Title II of HIPAA, 110
Stat at 2021-31, codified at 42 USC § 1320d-2 (2000). For a discussion of the legitimacy of the
privacy rules, see South Carolina Medical Association v Thompson, 327 F3d 346, 349-55 (4th Cir
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ways in which "covered entities"" can use or disclose protected health
information. Most notably, the rules restrict unauthorized uses and
disclosures of information related to nontreatment, nonpayment, and
non-healthcare operations." The privacy rules protect information that
is individually identifiable, 8 which is any personally identifying infor-
mation "created or received by a health care provider" that "[r]elates
to the ... health or condition of an individual" or to the provision of or
payment for healthcare." For instance, an individual's HIV-positive
status is protected health information," as is Daniel's participation in a
substance abuse program.
HIPAA permits covered entities to use or disclose information in
some circumstances, requires them to disclose information in others,
and prohibits use or disclosure of information in still others. A covered
entity may use and disclose protected health information for its own
treatment, payment, and healthcare operations and may make limited
disclosures to other entities for healthcare-operations activities, fraud
and abuse detection, and compliance." However, the privacy rules per-
mit covered entities to make only the minimum necessary disclosures."
2003) (concluding that HIPAA did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the promulgated
rules do not exceed the statutory authorization, and that the "non-preemption" provision was
not impermissibly vague); Assn ofAm Physicians & Surgeons v United States Dept of Health and
Human Services, 224 F Supp 2d 1115, 1126-29 (SD Tex 2002), affd, 67 Fed Appx 253 (5th Cir
2003) (concluding that regulations did not exceed statutory framework and that the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) took the proper procedural steps in promulgating the
rules).
16 A covered entity is essentially any healthcare provider (for example, a hospital) or in-
surer (for example, an HMO) that transmits health information electronically, including all
ERISA plans except self-insured plans that are administered by employers and have fewer than
fifty participants. 45 CFR §§ 160.102-160.103 (2004).
17 45 CFR § 164.502(a).
18 Protected Health Information means individually identifiable health information that is
"(i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or
maintained in any other form or medium," but excludes individually identifiable health informa-
tion in "(i) Education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) Records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); and (iii) Em-
ployment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer." 45 CFR § 160.103(1)-(2).
19 45 CFR § 160.103. Under the final rules, all individually identifiable health information
transmitted by a covered entity in any form is protected, whether oral, paper, or electronic. Id;
Office for Civil Rights, Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
online at http://aspe.hhs.gov/adnmsimp/final/pvcguidel.htm (visited Aug 17, 2005). For a discus-
sion of the legitimacy of extending protection beyond electronically transmitted information, see
South Carolina Medical Association, 327 F3d at 354 (holding that "[r]egulating non-electronic as
well as electronic forms of health information effectuates HIPAA's intent to promote the effi-
cient and effective portability of health information," is "not inconsistent with the language of
the statute[,] and is reasonably related to the larger purposes of HIPAA").
20 For a discussion about the particular needs of AIDSIHIV confidentiality, see Gilbert, 25
Whittier L Rev at 278-79 (cited in note 6).
21 45 CFR § 164.506(c).
22 Id § 164.502(b)(1).
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In addition, HIPAA requires covered entities to disclose informa-
tion in two circumstances: (1) when an individual or his personal rep-
resentative requests access to the individual's personal health infor-
mation, and (2) when HHS requests such information as part of a
compliance investigation or review.3 All other disclosures require the
covered individual's written authorization. 4 By strictly regulating the
disclosures of personally identifying health information, the rules en-
sure the privacy of individuals' health information."
2. Amendments for disclosures to plan sponsor.
The privacy rules require ERISA plan sponsors to create or alter
documents, including amending plan documents2 to restrict disclosure
of health information to plan sponsors." The regulation provides that
"a group health plan, in order to disclose protected health information
to the plan sponsor ... must ensure that the plan documents restrict
the uses and disclosures of such information by the plan sponsor con-
sistent with the requirements of this subpart."2' Proper disclosures in-
clude whether an individual participates in the health plan," summary
health information for use in obtaining bids from providers," and in-
formation necessary for administrative functions.31
3. Notice of privacy practices.
HIPAA requires ERISA plan sponsors to provide plan partici-
pants with documents detailing parties' rights and obligations under
HIPAA, including the "privacy notice."32 Each covered entity that cre-
23 Id § 164.502(a)(2)(i)-(ii), (g)(1).
24 Id § 164.508(a)(1). See also id § 164.508(c) (describing valid written authorizations).
25 See id § 164.502(e)(1) (detailing limitations on possible disclosures of third party busi-
ness associates). For the definition of a business associate, see id § 160.103.
26 ERISA plan sponsors are required to create and maintain written plan documents detail-
ing the rights and obligations of parties with respect to the plan. 29 USC § 1102(a)(1). The terms of
the plan, as embodied in these documents, can be privately enforced via § 502(a) of ERISA.
27 See 45 CFR § 164.504(f)(1).
28 Id § 164.504(0(1). See also id § 164.504(f)(2)(iii)(3) (stating that "the plan documents of
the group health plan must be amended to incorporate provisions" to restrict uses and disclo-
sures by plan sponsors).
29 Id § 164.504(f)(1)(iii).
30 Summary health information summarizes claims history, claims expenses, or types of
claims experiences. The information must be stripped of all identifiers. Id § 164.504(a).
31 Id § 164.504(f)(1)(ii).
32 The privacy rules provide, in relevant part:
(1) ... Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2) or (3) of this section, an individual has a
right to adequate notice of the uses and disclosures of protected health information that
may be made by the covered entity, and of the individual's rights and the covered entity's
legal duties with respect to protected health information.
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ates or receives protected health information must create and main-
tain a "Notice of Privacy Practices" detailing potential uses and disclo-
sures of protected health information.3 Although there are special
exemptions for group health plans, such plans are still required to
provide privacy notices if they do not provide health benefits through
an independent insurance provider or health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO)-that is, if they are self-insured." Additionally, group
health plans that are not self-insured but create or receive protected
health information must maintain privacy notices and provide such
31
notices upon request to any person.
Privacy notices must thoroughly communicate and represent par-
ticipants' rights and administrators' duties.4 In fact, the stated purpose
of a privacy notice is to describe to the participant how medical in-
formation may be used and disclosed and how the participant can ac-
cess such information.3 ' The privacy notice must be written in "plain
language," include at least one example of the types of uses and dis-
closures permitted, and detail all intended uses and disclosures that
may be made without the individual's consent. The notice must also
include a description of any disclosures that the plan intends to make
to the plan sponsor." Moreover, as a catchall, the notice must statethat no other uses and disclosures may be made without the individ-
(2) ... (i) An individual enrolled in a group health plan has a right to notice:
(A) From the group health plan, if, and to the extent that, such an individual does not
receive health benefits under the group health plan through an insurance contract with
a health insurance issuer or HMO;...
(ii) A group health plan that provides health benefits solely through an insurance contract
with a health insurance issuer or HMO, and that creates or receives protected health infor-
mation in addition to summary health information... or information on whether the indi-
vidual is participating in the group health plan, or is enrolled in or has disenrolled from a
health insurance issuer or HMO offered by the plan, must:
(A) Maintain a notice under this section; and
(B) Provide such notice upon request to any person.
Id § 164.520(a).
33 Id § 164.520(b)(1)(ii). Covered entities include all ERISA plans except self-insured
plans that are administered by employers and have fewer than fifty participants. Id § 160.102-
160.103.
34 Id § 164.520(a)(2)(i). Self-insured plans were required to provide these notices to all
participants by the compliance date. Id § 164.520(c)(2)(i)(A). New enrollees must be given a
copy of the notice upon enrollment and a reminder every three years that the notice is available
upon request. Id § 164.520(c)(1).
35 Id § 164.520(a)(2)(ii).
36 Id § 164.520(b).
37 Id § 164.520(b)(1)(i).
38 Id § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(B).
39 Id § 164.520(b)(1)(iii)(C).
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ual's written authorization and that the individual may revoke such
authorization at any time."
No court has considered whether privacy notices can be privately
enforced under ERISA. This Comment argues that the notices are meant
to be clear and representative of participants' rights and administrator's
duties and thus can and should serve as bases for suits under ERISA.
4. Enforcement.
Although the privacy rules are designed to protect individuals'
41private health information, Congress created no independent private
cause of action for privacy-rule violations. Instead, Congress provided
a public enforcement scheme that imposes penalties, including fines
and criminal punishment, for violations of the privacy rules. HHS's
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) enforces the privacy rules through a
43
complaint-driven process. OCR is required "to make sure that con-
sumers receive the privacy rights and protections required under the
new regulations."4 OCR can impose fines of up to $100 per knowing
failure to comply with a privacy-rule provision, not to exceed $25,000
per year for multiple violations of the same requirements.5 In addition
to assigning penalties, OCR can refer potential criminal violations to
40 Id § 164.520(b)(ii)(E). Other rights specified in the privacy notice include the right to
request additional restrictions with regard to health information; the right to request confidential
communications from the health plan; the right to inspect, copy, and amend personal health
information; and the right to receive an accounting of health information disclosures and a copy
of the privacy notice upon request. Id § 164.520(b)(1)(iv).
41 See HHS, News Release: Statement by Tommy G. Thompson, Apr 14, 2003, online at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/pressi2003pres/20030429a.html (visited Aug 17,2005):
Today's 4th Circuit ruling upholding the constitutionality of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
[South Carolina Medical Association, 327 F3d 346] is a victory for America's patients and
the principle that the federal government can provide protections to insure [sic] the en-
hanced confidentiality of their medical records.
This administration strongly supports a policy of providing a first-time-ever federal level of
protection for the medical records of all Americans. The rule helps to ensure appropriate
privacy safeguards are in place as we harness information technologies to improve the qual-
ity of care provided to patients. Consumers will benefit from these new limits on the way
their personal medical records may be used or disclosed by those entrusted with this sensi-
tive information.
42 HHS, Fact Sheet: Protecting the Privacy of Patients' Health Information, Apr 14, 2003,
online at http://www.hhagov/news/facts/privacy.html (visited Aug 17,2005).
43 45 CFR §§ 160.300-160.312.
44 HHS, Fact Sheet (cited in note 42). See also 45 CFR § 704.2 (stating that "[any person
may bring to the attention of the Commission a grievance that he or she believes falls within the
jurisdiction of the Commission" via a written complaint submitted to the Office of Civil Rights
Evaluation).
45 42 USC § 1320d-5(a)(1).
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the Department of Justice for further investigation and appropriate
action."6
It is still too early to determine how well these enforcement
methods work, but there is some suggestion of underenforcement.
Surprisingly few complaints were filed in the first year that the privacy
rules were effective, and no fines or criminal penalties were assessed
that year. 7 This apparent lack of enforcement could be OCR's re-
sponse to the health industry's concerns that enforcement would be
heavy-handed or could perhaps be due to a lack of funding. OCR has
a reputation for being "toothless,' 9 and some insiders opine that OCR
will not successfully enforce HIPAA.-'
Especially troubling is HIPAA's apparent lack of protection in
the workplace. Because employers are generally not covered entities,
complaints by employees that their health information has become
"the talk of the workplace" are beyond the jurisdiction of OCR to
investigate." Moreover, state-law privacy claims are often preempted
by ERISA in employment situations." However, this Comment argues
that health information created as a result of an employee health plan
can be protected against unauthorized employer access and disclosure
through ERISA.
Additionally, although HIPAA's civil and criminal enforcement
provisions should deter most violators, HIPAA contains no compensa-
tion provisions for the victims of privacy violations. Under HIPAA,
victims can only file written complaints, which may spark public en-
46 Id; Robin A. Johnson, Administrative Simplification Provisions of HIPAA, Mass Health
& Hospital Law 9-1 (2004) ("The statute establishes civil money penalties and criminal penalties
for violations.... HHS will enforce the civil money penalties, while the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice will enforce the criminal penalties.") (internal citations omitted), citing 42 USC § 1320d-5;
HHS, Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed Reg 82461 2-
01 at 82472 ("OCR will be responsible for enforcement of this regulation [including] investigat-
ing complaints and conducting compliance reviews; and, where voluntary compliance cannot be
achieved, seeking civil monetary penalties and making referrals for criminal prosecution.").
47 HIPAA Compliance Struegie. OCR Viewed by Many as "Toothdless"I HowAggressivey Wi It Enforce
HIPAA?,online at http'/www.aishealth.com/ComplianceAHipaa/RPPOCRToothlessHowAgressive.hml
(visited Aug 17,2005).
48 John R. Washlick, HIPAA Compliance: One Year Later, Physician's News Digest (Aug
2004), online at http://physiciansnews.comlaw/804washlick.html (visited Aug 17,2005).
49 HIPAA Compliance Strategies (cited in note 47).
50 Id ("An insider with close ties to government says as long as OCR is in charge, 'I don't
think you'll have successful HIPAA enforcement."').
51 Id.
52 See the discussion of ERISA preemption in Part I.B.2.
53 This aspect of the privacy rules was criticized in Sarah Lai Stirland, Privacy: Group
Blasts Enforcement of Healthcare Privacy Rules, Natl J Tech Daily (Apr 12,2004, PM ed) (quot-
ing the president of the Institute for Health Freedom as saying, "They've only been given the
right to complain, period .... We should have a law that's consumer, or citizen, driven.").
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forcement. ' For instance, if Daniel suspects that he was fired because
GM improperly accessed private health information related to his
treatment, he can file a complaint, which might lead to an investiga-
tion. As a result of the investigation, OCR could fine GM or refer GM
officials who accessed Daniel's private information to the Department
of Justice for possible prosecution and imprisonment. But the OCR
enforcement process would not restore Daniel's job; HIPAA does not
authorize the OCR or the Department of Justice to impose any rem-
edy or punishment other than those fines and criminal sentences
specified in 42 USC § 1320d-6,5 and at least one court has refused to
enjoin a privacy-rule violation."
B. ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA primarily to protect the interests of
participants in and beneficiaries of employee benefit welfare plans57 by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries and by providing appropriate remedies and access to fed-
eral courts.8
1. Written requirement.
A plan sponsor" is required to establish and maintain a plan in ac-
cordance with a written document. 6 Courts will focus on the written
plan document when examining the terms of the plan.6' However, as the
54 See 45 CFR § 704.2.
55 Perhaps recognizing this potential weakness in the HIPAA enforcement structure, at
least one court has opted to enforce the privacy rules under other federal regulations, specifi-
cally, the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For a discussion of Law v
Zuckerman, 307 F Supp 2d 705 (SD Md 2004), see Part III.A.2.
56 University of Colorado Hospital Authority v Denver Publishing Co, 340 F Supp 2d 1142,
1143-46 (D Colo 2004) (rejecting a hospital's request to enjoin the publication of protected
health information because HIPAA has no independent cause of action).
57 A welfare plan is
any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both .... for the purpose of providing its participants or their beneficiar-
ies [with certain benefits]. [These include] medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment.
29 USC § 1002(1).
58 Varity Corp v Howe, 516 US 489,513 (1996), citing 29 USC § 1001(b).
59 Employee welfare benefit plans are established by employers and/or employer unions
who are known as plan sponsors. 29 USC § 1002(1).
60 29 USC § 1102(a)(1).
61 See In re Unisys Corp Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litigation, 58 F3d 896, 902 (3d
Cir 1995) ("A court must examine the plan documents."); Biggers v Wittek Industries, 4 F3d 291,
295 (4th Cir 1993) ("A written plan is critical to ERISA's goal that employees be informed about
the benefits to which they are entitled. Oral or informal written amendments are inadequate to
alter the written terms of a plan, as this practice would undermine certainty."). See also Cinnelli v
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Eleventh Circuit pointed out in Donovan v Dillingham, - "it would be
incongruous for persons establishing or maintaining informal or unwrit-
ten employee benefit plans ... to circumvent the Act merely because an
administrator or other fiduciary failed to satisfy reporting or fiduciary
standards."63 Most courts have similarly held that a plan may exist even
in the absence of a written document.4 Also, as discussed in Part II.A.2,
most courts hold that some aspects of a plan may be ascertained from
sources other than the official written plan document.
2. ERISA preemption.
As evidenced by Daniel Duffy's case, ERISA contains a very
broad preemption clause that can preempt state privacy laws insofar
as they pertain to employee health benefits.' ERISA preempts, with
few exceptions, "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate," either directly or indirectly, "to any employee bene-
fit plan." Courts have traditionally held this provision to preempt
almost every type of claim that tangentially touches upon an ERISA-
regulated health plan, in order to promote the preemption clause's
purposes: eliminating conflicting and inconsistent state laws and free-
ing plan administrators from the burden of having to conform to more
than one set of laws and standards.67
The Supreme Court retreated from its original expansive interpre-
tation of ERISA preemption in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Insurance Co by stating that
"preemption does not occur ... if the state law has only a tenuous, re-
mote, or peripheral connection with covered plans."'9 However, the
Security Pacific Corp, 61 F3d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir 1995) (noting that claims for estoppel cannot
contradict the written terms of the plan).
62 688 F2d 1367 (llth Cir 1982) (en banc).
63 Id.at 1372.
64 For a complete listing by circuit, see Jayne E. Zanglein and Susan J. Stabile, ERISA
Litigation 7 (BNA Books 2003).
65 See In re General Motors Corp, 3 F3d 980,985 (6th Cir 1993) (holding that the plaintiffs'
state privacy claims for the employer's alleged access to health files were preempted by ERISA).
See also Nathalie Smith, Note, The Right to Genetic Privacy? Are We Unlocking the Secrets of the
Human Genome Only to Risk Insurance and Employment Discrimination?, 2000 Utah L Rev
705, 745-56 (discussing the policy behind proposed Utah state legislation restricting the use of
private health information in employment contexts).
66 29 USC § 1144.
67 See 120 Cong Rec H 29197 (Aug 20, 1974) (statement of Rep Dent) (asserting that
preemption protects "participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State
and local regulation").
68 514 US 645 (1995).
69 Id at 661, quoting District of Columbia v Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 US
125,130 n 1 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court's recent decision in Aetna Health Inc v Davila suggests that
ERISA preemption is still broad.1 Furthermore, lower court decisions
continue to include broad preemption language. For example, the Sixth
Circuit, while acknowledging certain exceptions to ERISA preemption
doctrine, has "repeatedly recognized that virtually all state law claims
relating to an employee benefit plan are preempted by ERISA."72
Although ERISA itself does not contain health privacy regula-
tions, courts have sometimes held that ERISA preempts state-created
private causes of action for privacy violations, leaving plaintiffs with-
out a viable state or federal cause of action. 3 This "regulatory vac-
uum" was criticized by Justice Ginsburg in her Davila concurrence.
Although Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority that upholding
ERISA preemption was consistent with governing case law, she as-
serted that the Court's "encompassing interpretation of ERISA's pre-
emptive force" coupled with "a cramped construction of the 'equitable
relief allowable under § 502(a)(3)" creates a "regulatory vacuum" in
which "[v]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few
federal substitutes are provided.""4
The problem that Justice Ginsburg notes is illustrated by Daniel's
dilemma. Daniel originally brought his claim under a state privacy law,
but the federal court held that GM's Employee Assistance Program
was an employee welfare benefit plan for purposes of ERISA and,
accordingly, that ERISA preempted Daniel's state privacy and breach
of confidentiality claims. Because ERISA has been held to preempt
state-law privacy claims without creating any of its own, plaintiffs like
Daniel have either a federal cause of action or none at all.
In contrast, other courts have construed ERISA's preemption
clause to be less inclusive when dealing with state-law health privacy
claims. For instance, the Fourth Circuit has held that claims regarding
the confidentiality of medical records are not preempted when the
offenses by the ERISA plan administrator are unrelated to the admin-
istrator's duties under the plan." Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, in a case
70 124 S Ct 2488 (2004).
71 Id at 2495-96.
72 Marks v Newcourt Credit Group, Inc, 342 F3d 444,452 (6th Cir 2003).
73 See, for example, In re General Motors, 3 F3d at 985.
74 Davila, 124 S Ct at 2503 (Ginsburg concurring) ("I also join the rising judicial chorus
suggesting that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled
ERISA regime.") (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting DiFelice v Aetna US. Healthcare,
346 F3d 442,453 (3d Cir 2003) (Becker concurring).
75 In re General Motors, 3 F3d at 985.
76 See Darcangelo v Verizon Communication! Inc, 292 F3d 181,194 (4th Cir 2002). See also
Duchesne-Baker v Extendicare Health Services Inc, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 18168, *21 (ED La)
("ERISA does not provide a cause of action to participants or beneficiaries for a plan administrator's
tortious acts that are unrelated to his duties pursuant to its administration of the ERISA plan.").
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involving a claim for tortious invasion of privacy, concluded that re-
strictions such as those prohibiting administrators from hiring private
investigators do not conflict with the purpose behind ERISA preemp-
tion-not to hold administrators accountable for fifty different sets of
rules for plan administration.'
The critical question for these courts seems to be this: how closely
does the state-law or tort claim "mandate employee benefit structures
or their administration"??7 The lesser the impact upon such structures
and administration, the less likely the state law is to be preempted by
ERISA 9 In the tortious invasion of privacy case described above, for
example, the plaintiff alleged that the investigators acquired personal
information about him by impersonating him." The Ninth Circuit sug-
gested that ERISA should not preempt any and every state tort claim:
"Making ERISA administrators liable for investigations perpetrated
by their agents which would be objectionable or offensive to the rea-
sonable man simply cannot be said to interfere with nationally uni-
form plan administration."'
Despite the more lenient approach adopted by some courts, how-
ever, the enactment of HIPAA may have rendered ERISA preemp-
tion of health privacy claims more likely. Health privacy was never a
"federal concern" before HIPAA, but the enactment of HIPAA has
made health privacy protection part of the administrative duties of
ERISA plan administrators. To the extent that state privacy laws or
tort actions interfere with the HIPAA privacy standards, then, ERISA
might preempt them.
Although the "amorphous contours of the preemption doctrine""
make it difficult to predict when ERISA will preempt state laws,
ERISA still preempts many state private remedies for patient confi-
dentiality violations. This is probably even truer after the enactment
77 Dishman v UNUM Life Insurance Co ofAmerica, 269 F3d 974,981-82 (9th Cir 2001).
78 Travelers, 514 US at 646.
79 Brian A. P6rez-Daple, Comment, Legal Reimbursement Claims by ER1SA Plan Fiduci-
aries, 72 U Chi L Rev 1103,1111-13 (2005).
80 Dishman, 269 F3d at 979.
81 Id at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Id at 980. See also Egelhoff v Egelhoff, 532 US 141,152-53 (2001) (Scalia concurring) ("I
remain unsure (as I think the lower courts and everyone else will be) as to what else triggers the
'relate to' provision.").
83 See Smith, Note, 2000 Utah L Rev at 734 (cited in note 65) (recognizing that although
ERISA itself does not contain provisions for the protection of patient confidentiality and pri-
vacy, state privacy remedies against self-insured employers are often preempted by ERISA);
Cynthia Stainer, Invasion of Medical Privacy, in Zanglein and Stabile, ERISA Litigation at 797-
808 (cited in note 64) (acknowledging the trend toward preempting state privacy law claims but
arguing that the trend may be reversing).
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of HIPAA. Thus, a federal cause of action for HIPAA privacy-rule
violations may be the only recourse available to private plaintiffs.'
Having established that there is no independent cause of action
under HIPAA and that ERISA preempts at least some state privacy
causes of action, it is important to examine how ERISA and HIPAA
interact to determine whether a privacy cause of action through ERISA
would be appropriate. The next Part seeks to answer that question.
II. ERISA ENFORCEMENT OF HIPAA:
SHOULD THERE BE A CAUSE OF AcTION?
Out of respect for the different roles of the legislature and judici-
ary, courts recognize only those statutory causes of action that Con-
gress intended to create." The Supreme Court has held that "the fact
that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does
not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that
person"' and that "private rights of action to enforce federal law must
be created by Congress.' 'n Although ERISA enforcement of HIPAA is
arguably more acceptable than an implied cause of action for HIPAA,
courts still will not find a cause of action where Congress intended
none to exist. Therefore, whether a court recognizes a private cause of
action for privacy-rule violations will depend upon Congress's intent
in enacting the two statutes, as manifested in the statutory language
and other expressions of intent.
When courts decide whether to infer a private cause of action
from a federal statute, their "focal point is Congress' intent in enacting
the statute.''n This inquiry does not "require evidence that Members of
Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the creation of
a private cause of action."" Rather, "Congress' intent may appear im-
plicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the circum-
stances of its enactment."'' However, "unless this congressional intent
84 See Bast v Prudential Insurance Co of America, 150 F3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir 1998) (hold-
ing that ERISA preempts state-law claims, even if the result is that a claimant, relegated to as-
serting a claim only under ERISA, is left without a remedy); Cromwell v Equicor-Equitable
HCA Corp, 944 F2d 1272,1276 (6th Cir 1991) ("Nor is it relevant to an analysis of the scope of
federal preemption that appellants may be left without a remedy.").
85 See Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 289 (2001) (holding that a statute must evince
"congressional intent to create new rights"); Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,730-31
(1979) (Powell dissenting) ("When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, fed-
eral courts should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy.").
86 Cannon, 441 US at 688.
87 Sandoval, 532 US at 286.
88 Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174,179 (1988).
89 Id.
90 Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory struc-
ture, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a
private remedy simply does not exist."9' In Thompson v Thompson,9
the Supreme Court determined legislative intent by looking to the
context, language, and legislative history of the statute.9 Subsequently,
the Court condensed the inquiry, first examining the statutory text for
rights-creating language" and then exploring the legislative history.9'
This Part first considers Congress's intent as manifested in the statu-
tory language of both HIPAA and ERISA" and then examines the
practical impact that ERISA-based enforcement would have on
HIPAA's regulatory scheme.
A. Determining Congress's Intent
Only one court has considered an independent cause of action for
the HIPAA privacy rules,7 and no court has considered an ERISA-
based cause of action for privacy-rule violations. This Part argues that
although, as the University of Colorado Hospital Authority v Denver
Publishing Co' court held, there is no manifest congressional intent to
create an independent cause of action under HIPAA, Congress did
demonstrate an intent to create an ERISA-based cause of action.
91 Id (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
92 484 US 174 (1988).
93 Id at 187 (concluding that an investigation into congressional intent behind the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act revealed no intent to create a private cause of action to determine
the validity of competing state custody decisions).
94 Sandoval, 532 US at 288 (beginning the investigation into congressional intent with the
"text and structure" of the statute itself). See also Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273,284 n 3
(2002) ("Where a statute does not include this sort of explicit 'right or duty-creating language'
we rarely impute to Congress an intent to create a private right of action.").
95 Sandoval, 532 US at 288 ("In [Thompson], this sort of 'contemporary legal context'
simply buttressed a conclusion independently supported by the text of the statute.").
96 Although the Supreme Court has held that "even the most basic general principles of
statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent," National Rail-
road Passenger Corp v National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 US 453,458 (1974), there
is no compelling legislative history regarding HIPAA private remedies. See University of Colo-
rado Hospital Authority v Denver Publishing Co, 340 F Supp 2d 1142, 1145 (D Colo 2004);
Wright v Combined Insurance Co of America, 959 F Supp 356, 363 (ND Miss 1997) ("[I]n
HIPAA, the undersigned cannot find any 'manifest congressional intent' to create a new federal
cause of action."); Means v Individual Life & Accident Insurance Co, 963 F Supp 1131,1135 (MD
Ala 1997) ("[T]he court finds no evidence of congressional intent to create a private right of
action under HIPAA.").
97 University of Colorado, 340 F Supp 2d 1142 (declining to find a private cause of action in
HIPAA privacy rules).
98 340 F Supp 2d 1142 (D Colo 2004).
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1. Rights-creating language.
When determining whether a private cause of action exists, courts
look for "rights-creating language" that distinguishes a statute from
other merely regulatory laws. "Right[s]-creating language" is language
"explicitly confer[ring] a right directly on a class of persons that in-
clude[s] the plaintiff in [a] case."'
a) Implied cause of action. The University of Colorado court re-
lied on the lack of rights-creating language to dismiss an implied pri-
vate cause of action under the HIPAA privacy rules. In that case, a
hospital filed a complaint under HIPAA to enjoin a newspaper from
publishing information obtained during a hospital peer review pro-
ceeding.1  The hospital alleged that some of the information was sub-
ject to protection under HIPAA § 1320d-6.'O' The court found that nei-
ther § 1320d-6 nor any other section of HIPAA contains any language
conferring privacy rights upon any specific class of persons; HIPAA
instead focuses on regulating persons with access to individuals'
health information.2 Because the Supreme Court has held that
"[s]tatutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the indi-
viduals protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on
a particular class of persons, ' 0 the University of Colorado court found
no implied cause of action."
b) ERISA-based cause of action. Unlike an independent cause of
action for privacy-rule violations, however, ERISA-based enforce-
ment finds textual support in ERISA § 502(a). ERISA explicitly al-
lows beneficiaries and participants to sue under the terms of the plan.
Likewise, HIPAA explicitly makes reference to and regulates ERISA
plans with respect to private health information. These two distinc-
tions, combined with the traditional judicial gloss read into §
502(a)(3), make congressional intent to allow ERISA-based private
claims seem much more likely than congressional intent to create an
independent cause of action under HIPAA.
When interpreting the rights-creating language of ERISA § 502(a)(3),
courts recognize that "Congress intended a federal common law of
rights and obligations guided by principles of trust law to develop un-
der ERISA..'. Thus, courts have traditionally interpreted § 502(a)(3)
99 See Cannon, 441 US at 690 n 13.
100 University of Colorado, 340 F Supp 2d at 1142.
101 Id.
102 Id at 1145.
103 Id at 1144, quoting Sandoval, 532 US at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id.
105 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc v Moran, 536 US 355,377 (2002).
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with a certain gloss of federal common law. 6 Courts recognize that
"[w]henever Congress enacts complex and comprehensive legislation,
such as ERISA, minor gaps in the legislation are unavoidable," and
that "[i]t is the judiciary's role ... to fill in these gaps."' ',
Although judges "proceed cautiously in creating additional rights
under the rubric of federal common law, and ... remember that [they]
do not possess carte blanche authority to . .. re-write a federal stat-
ute,""' the Supreme Court has interpreted § 502(a)(3)'s protection to
be especially broad. For instance, the Supreme Court in Varity Corp v
Howe" found an implied cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in
the "catchall" provision of § 502(a)(3). The Court found persuasive the
fact that plaintiffs would have to proceed under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA
or "have no remedy at all..... Subsequent courts have also allowed actions
under § 502 where a plaintiff has "no adequate remedy elsewhere in
ERISA's statutory framework.""' Because courts interpret § 502(a)(3)'s
rights-creating language broadly, the argument for ERISA-based en-
forcement for the HIPAA privacy rules is much stronger than that for
an implied cause of action under HIPAA.
Although Congress did not explicitly address ERISA enforce-
ment in the text of HIPAA, it might have manifested an intent to cre-
ate such enforcement in the manner in which the two statutes interact.
ERISA § 502(a) allows beneficiaries and participants to sue under the
terms of the plan, and Congress specifically included references to
ERISA plans in HIPAA's compliance provisions."2 Likewise, the pri-
vacy rules, as enacted by the Secretary of HHS, specifically require the
amendment of "plan documents of the group health plan""'3 and re-
quire some plans to provide privacy notices."' Although Congress did
not enact the specific rules, it gave free reign to the Secretary to do so
and could have expected the rule to impact other related regulatory
schemes, such as ERISA.
106 For instance, courts have recognized a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, as
discussed in Part III.C.
107 Jamail, Inc v Carpenters District Council of Houston Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954 F2d
299,303 (5th Cir 1992).
108 Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co v Waller, 906 F2d 985,992 (4th Cir 1990).
109 516 US 489 (1995).
110 Id at 515.
Ill See, for example, Jones v American General Life and Accident Insurance Co, 370 F3d
1065, 1074 (11th Cir 2004).
112 See HIPPA § 262, 110 Stat 1936,2022.
113 45 CFR § 164.504(f)(2).
114 See id § 164.520(a)(2)(i). Self-insured plans were required to provide these notices to all
participants by the compliance date. See id § 164.520(c)(2)(i)(A). New enrollees must be given a
copy of the notice upon enrollment and a reminder every three years that the notice is available
upon request. See id § 164.520(c)(1).
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When Congress passes a law, it is "always appropriate to assume
that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law" and
legislate with full knowledge of the potential effects that an old statute
might have on a new one.'" Courts can, therefore, assume that Con-
gress was aware of the liberal interpretation of ERISA § 502(a)(3)
when it passed HIPAA. To the extent that Congress showed aware-
ness of HIPAA's effects on ERISA plans, and even went so far as to
exclude some plans but not others from HIPAA's requirements, ' it
arguably intended to create an enforcement right for the privacy rules
through ERISA's statutory scheme.
2. Explicit public enforcement provisions.
In addition to rights-creating language, courts also place great
weight on whether there is a preexisting public enforcement scheme.
Although it is true that a statute providing for a criminal penalty
"does not necessarily preclude the implication of a private cause of
action for damages,'.. courts are reluctant to recognize additional
remedies where a statute expressly provides one."'
In University of Colorado, the district court noted that the pres-
ence of a specific civil and criminal enforcement scheme for HIPAA
weighed heavily against an implied private cause of action for HIPAA
privacy-rule violations."9 Likewise, when examining a potential cause
of action under ERISA § 502(a)(3), the Supreme Court noted that
"where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a benefici-
ary's injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief."'"
However, at least one court has opined that the public enforce-
ment provisions of the privacy rules are not the only enforcement
mechanism available for those rules. Specifically, in Law v Zucker-
man,"' the court was willing to enforce the privacy rules through the
discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
'
115 Cannon, 441 US at 696-97 (holding that awareness of prior judicial interpretation of
laws reflects their intent with respect to newly created laws).
116 See 45 CFR § 160.102, excluding those plans that are self-insured plans, are administered
by a sole employer, and have fewer than fifty participants.
117 Cort v Ash, 422 US 66,79 (1975).
118 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors (TAMA), Inc v Lewis, 444 US 11, 19 (1979). ("[I]t
is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particu-
lar remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.").
119 See 340 F Supp 2d at 1144-45.
120 Varity Corp, 516 US at 515.
121 307 F Supp 2d 705 (SD Md 2004).
122 Id at 712 (concluding that since HIPAA does not provide guidance on "how a court
should treat ... a violation during discovery or at trial, the type of remedy to be applied is within
the discretion of the Court under [FRCP] 37").
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The defendant's attorney in Law violated the privacy rules by dis-
cussing the plaintiff's health information with her doctor without her
permission.' Although the court ultimately found that limiting
subsequent communications between the opposing attorney and the
treating physician was unwarranted because of the opposing attor-
ney's good-faith reliance on a state health-privacy statute, it held that
the information was obtained in violation of the HIPAA privacy rules
and suggested that the information could be held inadmissible at
trial."4
The court recognized that HIPAA has its own enforcement
mechanism, but it pointed out that HIPAA does not dictate how a
court should treat such a violation during discovery or at trial. Be-
cause HIPAA directly regulates discovery but does not provide a spe-
cific remedy for discovery abuse, the Law court felt free to supple-
ment HIPAA's statutory enforcement provisions under the discovery
rules. Following this reasoning, because HIPAA directly regulates
ERISA plans without providing a specific remedy for ERISA em-
ployment-related violations,'" a court could find that ERISA's en-
forcement mechanisms, not HIPAA's, apply to such violations.
In sum, although the legislative history contains no explicit state-
ment of congressional intent to create an ERISA cause of action for
violations of the HIPAA privacy rules, Congress created the statutes
to interact with each other in such a way as to imply its intent to allow
for ERISA enforcement.
B. Impact of ERISA Enforcement on HIPAA's
Enforcement Scheme
This Part argues that, like the procedural enforcement of Law,
ERISA-based enforcement of the HIPAA privacy rules would fully
effectuate the purpose of HIPAA without undermining either public
enforcement of HIPAA or the ERISA regulatory system. ERISA-
based enforcement would be available only in relation to employee
benefit plans and, because of the limited remedies available, would
likely be used only when state-law claims are preempted.
1. HIPAA in the employment context.
Rules restricting employers' access to employees' health informa-
tion are essential because ERISA, for the first time, gave employers
123 Id at 707.
124 Id at 712-13.
125 See Part I.A.1 for a discussion of HIPAA regulation of ERISA plan usage of health
information.
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broad access to such information.26 Congress, in passing HIPAA, recog-
nized that health information had become more vulnerable with the
increasing use of electronic storage, which is especially susceptible to
unauthorized access.'2' This trend is especially problematic in the em-
ployment context: the danger is that employers will make employment
decisions based upon private employee health information. ' Adequate
protection for the privacy of health information is important because
without it, employees may not confide in their doctors for fear of ad-
verse employment consequences. Allowing ERISA-based enforce-
ment of the privacy rules would strengthen HIPAA's prohibition on
unauthorized employer access without interfering with HIPAA's gen-
eral enforcement scheme.
2. Safeguards to overenforcement.
ERISA's remedies are limited such that a § 502(a)(3) suit would
be a plaintiff's last resort. ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes only "appro-
priate" equitable relief, and the Supreme Court has suggested that
"courts, in fashioning 'appropriate' equitable relief, will keep in mind
the 'special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,' and will
respect the 'policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain reme-
dies and the exclusion of others.' ' -
Likewise, whether a court would accept a § 502(a)(3) request for
relief for privacy-rule violations would depend on whether it deter-
mined that "Congress had elsewhere provided adequate relief for [the]
beneficiary's injury. 13' Courts could decide on a case-by-case basis
126 See Peter Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Com-
mon Law, 33 Rutgers L J 617, 633-34 (2002) (discussing policy arguments for regulating health
information in employment situations).
127 See 142 Cong Rec H 9793 (Aug 1,1996). Representative DeFazio from Oregon said:
In addition, I am very concerned about a provision in the conference report that threaten[s]
the continued privacy of our medical records. As Americans we cherish our fundamental
right to privacy. Over the past few decades we have seen this right chipped away by techno-
logical advances we could never [have] foreseen. We have all seen how legislation ensuring
the continued right to privacy has not kept up with these advances. This conference report
strikes another blow at our privacy by requiring administrative simplification of medical re-
cords without providing adequate protections.
Id. See also Henry T. Greely, Comment, Trusted Systems and Medical Records: Lowering Expec-
tations, 52 Stan L Rev 1585, 1587 (2000) (discussing the increased vulnerability of electronic
health information).
128 Studies indicate that nearly half of employers use employee health information to make
employment-related decisions. See Winn, 33 Rutgers L J at 633 (cited in note 126), citing David
F. Linowes and Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of the '90s, 23 John Marshall L Rev
591,593-94 (1990).
129 See Winn, 33 Rutgers L J at 633 (cited in note 126).
130 Varity Corp, 516 US at 515, quoting Pilot Life Insurance Co v Dedeaux, 481 US 41,54 (1987).
131 Id at 515.
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whether HIPAA's enforcement scheme provided adequate relief for a
particular plaintiff. Or courts could decide, as the Law court seemed to
find, that the civil and criminal penalties authorized under HIPAA are
insufficient to enforce the privacy rules in the employment setting.
ERISA-based enforcement would supplement HIPAA's regula-
tory scheme in the employment context in much the same way the
discovery rules supplemented HIPAA in the litigation context. Be-
cause of the "regulatory vacuum""2 from possible ERISA preemption
and the unique nature of health information in the workplace,
ERISA-based enforcement of the privacy rules is consistent with both
the "gap-filling"'33 common law interpretation of ERISA, and
HIPAA's overall enforcement scheme.
III. ENFORCING HIPAA THROUGH ERISA STATUTORY SUITS
Although courts have yet to consider a cause of action for viola-
tions of HIPAA's privacy rules under ERISA § 502(a)(3)'s equitable
enforcement of terms of the plan, this Comment contends that such a
cause of action would be legally sound.'3 This Part argues that privacy-
rule plaintiffs may be able to enforce the rules as "terms of the plan"
or through breach of fiduciary duty claims. Part III.A discusses statu-
tory remedies generally, including proper plaintiffs and defendants
and the remedies available under § 502(a)(3). Part III.B argues that
HIPAA plaintiffs can sue under the "terms of the plan" either using
the amendments to the plan regarding disclosures to a plan sponsor
or, more broadly, the privacy notice. Part III.C compares a § 502(a)(3)
suit under the terms of the plan with a suit under the same provision
for breach of fiduciary duty.
132 Davila, 124 S Ct at 2503 (Ginsburg concurring).
133 Susan C. Davis, Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.: Upholding Compul-
sory Arbitration of ERISA Claims Properly Treats All Investors Equally, 75 Minn L Rev 123, 151
(1990).
134 In passing, some practitioners have flagged this cause of action as a possibility, without
providing subsequent analysis. See, for example, Samuel M. Brock III, Angela F. Hill, and Grant
PH. Shuman, Health Related Information and Employment Decisions: Is Your ERISA Plan Sub-
ject to Privacy Rights Under HIPAA?, 24 Energy & Mineral L Inst ch 1 at 28 (2004):
"Violations" of HIPAA involving sponsors of group health plans that are covered by
HIPAA ... may be subject to a suit under ERISA and ERISA's full panoply of remedies.
HIPAA requires that the plan documents of group health plans be amended to include the
protections of the Privacy Rules. Thus, plan participants may bring claims for breach of fi-
duciary duty, or claims to enforce plan provisions or enjoin plan violations, for what, essen-
tially, are violations of HIPAA's Privacy Rules.
See also Diane Kutzko, et al, HIPAA in Real Time: Practical Implications of the Federal Privacy
Rule, 51 Drake L Rev 403, 450 (2003). These articles focused on only the amendments required
under 45 CFR § 164.504(f)(1)-(2), not the privacy notices required under 45 CFR § 160.501.
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A. Statutory Remedies Generally
ERISA provides for private remedies mainly through
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and its equitable companion, § 502(a)(3). These two
provisions give participants and beneficiaries a cause of action to re-
cover benefits due under the terms of the plan, to enforce rights under
the terms of the plan, and to clarify rights to any future benefits under
the terms of the plan.'5 Although courts have yet to use ERISA to
enforce HIPAA's privacy rules, connecting the dots between ERISA
and HIPAA suggests that most violations of HIPAA privacy rules are
actionable under the "catchall" provisions of the equitable § 502(a)(3).
ERISA § 502 states, in pertinent part:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may
be brought ... (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other ap-
propriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.'-
ERISA § 502(a)(3) suits are not limited to suits under the terms of the
plan but also include suits for breach of fiduciary duty. 7
The rest of this Part will discuss proper plaintiffs, defendants, and
remedies. It will argue that because proper plaintiffs and remedies are
limited, ERISA enforcement of health privacy rules will likely be lim-
ited to employment situations preempted by ERISA instead of being
used as a general substitute for state privacy law claims. However, be-
cause ERISA plaintiffs can sue a broad range of defendants, ERISA-
based enforcement will have more bite than the current HIPAA com-
plaint process.
1. Proper plaintiffs and defendants.
Proper plaintiffs under § 502(a) are participants,3 beneficiaries,'3 9
or fiduciaries"O of the plan, or the Secretary of Labor. The general rule
135 For a list of examples of 29 USC § 1132(a)(1)(B) litigation, see Zanglein and Stabile,
ERISA Litigation at 73-76 (cited in note 64).
136 29 USC § 1132(a)(3).
137 See Varity Corp, 516 US at 512 (interpreting § 502(a)(3) as providing appropriate equi-
table relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not address elsewhere, including
breach of fiduciary duty). See also Devlin v Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F3d 76,89 (2d
Cir 2001) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court held that such claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty could
be brought by individual plaintiffsL"); Watson v Deaconess Waltham Hospital, 141 F Supp 2d 145,
150 (D Mass 2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA § 502(a)(3) ... to permit an
individual to sue directly for a breach of fiduciary duty, as long as she seeks equitable relief.").
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is that nonenumerated parties do not have standing to sue, 14 and em-
ployers usually are excluded. ' Additionally, although courts differ on
whether plaintiffs with derivative standing 3 may sue under ERISA
§ 502(a), in most circuits derivative standing is at least a colorable
claim under which assignees may be able to sue to uphold terms of the
plan.'" If proper plaintiffs have brought the action under § 502(a), the
proper venue is a federal court notwithstanding the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties. 4
More important for a privacy-rule plaintiff is the broad range of po-
tential defendants. Courts have held that a proper plaintiff can bring suit
in equity under § 502(a)(3) against third parties "where necessary to re-
dress a violation of the terms of the Plan or to enforce the Plan."'" Since
the remedy provided by § 502(a)(3) is injunctive,'' the appropriate de-
fendants are the entities whom the plaintiff seeks to enjoin. These could
include participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, nonfiduciaries, employers,
unions, the plan trustees, or the plan administrator.'
138 Participants are defined as "any employee or former employee of an employer ... who is
or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which
covers employees of such employer." 29 USC § 1002(7).
139 A beneficiary is defined as "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id § 1002(8).
140 Fiduciaries are generally designated as such in the plan documents and are individuals
who "have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of [a] plan." Id
§ 1102(a)(1). For the statutory definition of fiduciaries, see id § 1002(21).
141 For a complete listing by area of law, see Zanglein and Stabile, ERISA Litigation at 113
n 113 (cited in note 64).
142 See Healthtek Solution4 Inc v Fortis Benefits Insurance Co,274 F Supp 2d 767,775 (ED Va 2003).
143 An example of derivative standing would be a suit for benefits by a valid assignee. As-
signees are those who get their rights assigned to them by an enumerated party (for example, a
participant, beneficiary, etc.). Most courts hold that the assignment must be valid in order to sue
under the terms of the plan. Zanglein and Stabile, ERISA Litigation at 120 (cited in note 64).
144 For a list, by circuit, of examples of derivative ERISA § 502 litigation, see id at 167-68.
145 29 USC § 1132(e)(1); 29 USC § 1132(f).
146 Central States; Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund v Comprehensive
Care Corp, 864 F Supp 831,833 (ND Ill 1994), discussing Blue Cross and Blue Shield v Weitz, 913
F2d 1544 (11th Cir 1990). See also Milwaukee Carpenter's District Council Health Fund v Philip
Morris Inc, 70 F Supp 2d 888, 897 (ED Wis 1999) ("[ERISA § 502(a)(3)] is not by its terms lim-
ited to suits by fiduciaries against plan participants or beneficiaries, but extends to suits against
third parties as well.").
147 See Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co v Knudson, 534 US 204,210 (2002) (noting
that the proper relief under § 502(a)(3) is limited to those forms of relief that were typically
available in equity).
148 See Harris Trust and Savings Bank v Salomon Smith Barney, Inc, 530 US 238, 246-47
(2000) (noting that 29 USC § 1132(a)(3) "admits of no limit... on the universe of possible de-
fendants. Indeed [it] makes no mention at all of which parties may be proper defendants").
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2. Equitable relief.
Equitable relief is the proper type of relief for privacy-rule plain-
tiffs suing under § 502(a)(3).' 9 The Supreme Court stated in Great-
West Life & Annuity Insurance Co v Knudson that "equitable relief
in § 502(a)(3) must refer to those categories of relief that were typi-
cally available in equity.''5' In a prior decision, the Court held that res-
titution is "a remedy traditionally viewed as 'equitable,' ' '52 and other
courts have recognized that employment reinstatement is an equitable
remedy."' In Schwartz v Gregori,'- for instance, the Sixth Circuit de-
termined that the plaintiff had been discharged from her employment
in retaliation for exercising her rights under ERISA"5' and was entitled
to either reinstatement or front pay under § 502(a)(3)."'
B. Suits Under the Terms of the Plan
ERISA § 502(a)(3) allows proper plaintiffs to sue to enforce their
rights under the terms of the plan. Any changes to ERISA plan docu-
ments could potentially be considered changes to the "terms of the
plan" under § 502(a)(3). HIPAA requires the production or amend-
ment of ERISA plan documents in two ways. First, it requires plan
administrators to amend plan documents in order to prevent misuse
of health information by plan sponsors." Second, it requires self-
insured group health plans and plans that create or maintain personal
health information to provide privacy notices detailing the uses and
disclosures of protected health information.' This Part will discuss in
turn each of these HIPAA documents as a potential basis for suit. This
Part argues that of the two, the privacy notice is much broader in
scope, applying not only to transactions by the plan sponsor but po-
tentially to all transactions, uses, and disclosures of an individual's
health information. If a court were to interpret these HIPAA docu-
149 See 29 USC § 1132(a)(3) (providing that plaintiffs suing under the terms of the plan may
obtain "other appropriate equitable relief").
150 534 US 204 (2002).
151 Id at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted).
152 Mertens, 508 US at 255.
153 See, for example, Schwartz v Gregori, 45 F3d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir 1995).
154 45 F3d 1017 (6th Cir 1995).
155 The plaintiff sued to enforce her rights as set forth in 29 USC § 1140: "It shall be unlaw-
ful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a partici-
pant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan." 45 F3d at 1020.
156 Schwartz, 45 F3d at 1023.
157 See 45 CFR § 164.504(f)(1)-(2).
158 See id § 164.520(a) (covering self-insured plans or plans that produce or maintain pri-
vate health information).
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ments and amendments as embodying "terms of the plan," a violation
of those terms would be actionable under ERISA § 502(a)(3).' 9
1. Plan amendments as terms of the plan.
Because HIPAA requires amendments to ERISA plan docu-
ments to restrict disclosures to plan sponsors,' ° plaintiffs should be
able to enforce those restrictions/amendments as "terms of the plan"
under § 502(a)(3). Plan sponsors are required to establish and main-
tain a plan in accordance with a written document, 161 which courts
have accepted as containing terms of the plan." Amendments to the
plan, if valid,1u represent enforceable terms of the plan.'1' As the Su-
preme Court held in Curtiss-Wright Corp v Schoonejongen,'& "Em-
ployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for
any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans."'
' 6
Amendments to the health plan made pursuant to the privacy rules
and restricting access to plan sponsors should, 67 if properly made,
likewise be considered terms of the plan, violations of which are ac-
tionable under § 502(a)(3).
2. Privacy notices as terms of the plan.
The second set of documents -privacy notices -provides a
broader series of claims, because privacy notices cover disclosures to
all third parties, not just plan sponsors. Although some ERISA case
law has held that similarly representative documents embody terms of
the plan under § 502(a), other courts have been reluctant to find
"terms" anywhere outside of the standard plan documents.
a) The split over outside sources. Courts are reluctant to recog-
nize insufficiently formal modifications to an ERISA plan, because
ERISA imposes particular requirements upon covered entities for
159 See 29 USC § 1132(a)(3).
160 See 45 CFR § 164.504(0(1).
161 See 29 USC § 1102.
162 See Moore v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 856 F2d 488,492 (2d Cir 1988) ("Congress
intended that plan documents and the [summary plan descriptions] exclusively govern an em-
ployer's obligations under ERISA plans.").
163 See, for example, Curtiss-Wright Corp v Schoonejongen, 514 US 73,78 (1995) (reasoning
that a § 402(b)(3) [29 USC § 1102(b)(3)] analysis of the validity of an amendment requires that
the plan must set forth who is authorized to amend the plan and how amendments are to be
effectuated).
164 See Ross v Rail Car America Group Disability Income Plan, 285 F3d 735, 741-43 (8th
Cir 2002) (reasoning that since plan amendments were properly enacted, terms of the plan come
from those amendments).
165 514 US 73 (1995).
166 Id at 78.
167 See 45 CFR § 164.504(0(1).
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adopting and amending a written plan. ' The purpose of the required
formalities is twofold: to ensure that "proposed plan amendments,
which are fairly serious events, are recognized as such and given the
special consideration they deserve,"'6 9 and to allow administrators to
distinguish "the bona fide amendments from those that are not."
Because privacy notices, unlike HIPAA plan amendments, do not nec-
essarily add to or change actual plan documents, whether or not they
constitute terms of the plan depends upon their perceived formality
and representativeness.
Probably the most widely recognized outside source of plan terms
is the "summary plan description.' 7' Many courts enforce summary
plan descriptions even over conflicting terms in actual plan documents.' 2
Although some courts seem to place great weight on the fact that sum-
mary plan descriptions are required by § 102 of ERISA," other courts
have accepted documents other than summary plan descriptions as
containing terms of the plan, so long as those documents are similarly
representative.' In Brines v XTRA Corp,'' the Seventh Circuit noted
that while informal modifications of ERISA plans are not permitted,
prior cases have recognized plan modifications even in the absence of
formal documentation. 6 Additionally, since employers often have dif-
ferent plans covering different benefits, informal documentation could
arguably constitute a separate and enforceable plan, so long as it does
not contradict the written plan.'
168 See Winterrowd v American General Annuity Insurance Co, 321 F3d 933,937-38 (9th Cir
2003) (explaining that the purpose of § 402's amendment procedures is to prohibit plan modifi-
cations that are too informal).
169 Curtiss-Wright Corp, 514 US at 82.
170 Id. See HR Rep No 1280, 93d Cong, 2d Sess (1974), reprinted at 1974 USCCAN 5077-58
("A written plan is to be required in order that every employee may, on examining the plan
documents, determine exactly what his rights and obligations are under the plan.").
171 Summary plan descriptions are defined in the statute as "sufficiently accurate and com-
prehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obliga-
tions under the plan." 29 USC § 1022(a).
172 Specifically, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
all held that the summary plan description trumps other plan documents. For a more complete
listing by circuit, see Zanglein and Stabile, ERISA Litigation at 467 n 69 (cited in note 64).
173 See, for example, Burstein v Retirement Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health
Educ & Research Found, 334 F3d 365, 379-80 (3d Cir 2003) (finding that summary plan descriptions
are required by § 102 (29 USC § 1022) and are meant to be "accurate" and "sufficiently comprehensive
to reasonably apprise plan participants of their rights and obligations under the plan").
174 See, for example, Kochendorfer v Rockdale Sash and Trim Co, Inc Profit Sharing Plan,
653 F Supp 612,614-16 (ND I1 1987) (accepting a record-keeping booklet given to a participant
in a profit-sharing plan as a summary plan description).
175 304 F 3d 699 (7th Cir 2002).
176 See id at 701-02.
177 See id.
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Not all courts accept summary plan descriptions or other less of-
ficial documents as terms of the plan, however. In O'Brien v Sperry
Univac,'7 8 the court acknowledged that "the statute's definition of
'plan' is not limited to a single document," but ultimately rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the summary plan description contained
"terms of the plan."'' . Likewise, another court held that outside docu-
ments cannot invalidate actual portions of the plan."' In Moore v Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co,"' the Second Circuit explained the policy
reasons for limiting sources of terms of the plan:
Congress intended that plan documents and [summary plan
documents] exclusively govern an employer's obligations under
ERISA plans .... Were all communications between an employer
and plan beneficiaries to be considered . .. as establishing the
terms of a welfare plan, the plan documents ... would establish
merely a floor for an employer's future obligations. Predictability
as to the extent of future obligations would be lost, and, conse-
quently, substantial disincentives for even offering such plans
would be created9
Another court held that the crucial issue is to identify "which of
the plethora of papers proffered by parties constitute 'official plan
documents.' '' . In reaching its conclusion, the court noted the inherent
difficulty in determining what constitutes a sufficiently official plan
document containing terms of the plan:
Both sides agree on the obvious ends of the spectrum: Each ver-
sion of the Plan itself is an official plan document, while a num-
ber of letters and interoffice memoranda are not. However, the
parties seem to part company over which of the many booklets
distributed to employees constitute official plan documents. 18
Whether privacy notices are closer to one end or the other of the spec-
trum depends, then, upon judicial determinations of their formality
and representativeness.
b) Privacy notices as outside sources. Privacy notices play a role
similar to that of summary plan descriptions: they explain the rights
and duties of parties with regards to the plan. Covered ERISA plans
must provide the notices to all participants. Privacy notices, like sum-
178 458 F Supp 1179 (D DC 1978).
179 Id at 1180.
180 See Guthrie v Dow Chemical Co, 445 F Supp 311,314-15 (SD Tex 1978).
181 856 F2d 488 (2d Cir 1988).
182 Id at 492.
183 Etherington v Bankers Life and Casualty Co, 747 F Supp 1269, 1276 (ND 11 1990).
184 Id (internal citations omitted).
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mary plan descriptions, are subject to highly formalized regulations
governing content and means of dissemination.' As explained in Part
I.A, privacy notices must be written in plain language, include an ex-
ample of a permitted disclosure, and detail all disclosures that can be
made without the participant's consent.
The requirements for privacy notices suggest that such notices,
like summary plan descriptions, represent the rights and obligations of
parties regarding health information. For instance, the following
statement must feature prominently in every privacy notice: "THIS
NOTICE DESCRIBES HOW MEDICAL INFORMATION ABOUT
YOU MAY BE USED AND DISCLOSED AND HOW YOU CAN
GET ACCESS TO THIS INFORMATION." Likewise, the language
of privacy notices appears to represent rights and duties; for instance,
a privacy notice might include a section stating that:
Other uses and disclosures of medical information not covered
by this notice or the laws that apply to us will be made only with
your written permission, unless those uses can be reasonably in-
ferred from the intended uses above. If you have provided us
with your permission to use or disclose medical information
about you, you may revoke that permission, in writing, at any
time. If you revoke your permission, we will no longer use or dis-
close medical information about you for the reasons covered by
your written authorization. You understand that we are unable to
take back any disclosures we have already made with your per-
mission, and that we are required to retain our records of the
care that we provided to you.""
Privacy notices clearly seem to fulfill the first policy behind requiring
formal amendments: flagging for beneficiaries important changes re-
garding changes to their rights under the plan.
In addition to bringing important plan changes to the attention of
beneficiaries, requiring formal plan amendments also promotes ad-
ministrative efficiency by helping administrators to distinguish be-
tween bogus and bona fide plan modifications.'m Some courts have
185 Compare 29 USC § 1022, with 45 CFR § 164.520.
186 45 CFR § 164.520(b)(1)(i).
187 See Ophthalmology Ltd Eye Institute and Laser Center, Notice of Privacy Practices,
online at http://www.ophthalmologyltd.com/PrivacyPolicy.cfm (visited Aug 17, 2005).
188 See Curtiss-Wright, 514 US at 82. During debates for the Bipartisan Patient Protection
Act, S 872, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (May 14, 2001), which passed the Senate in 2001 but failed to
pass in the House of Representatives, see States News Service, Sen. Boxer Introduces Patients'
Bill of Rights (Feb 17, 2004), at least one member of Congress expressed concern that giving
patients a private cause of action against HMOs and ERISA self-insured employers would
prompt small businesses to drop their insurance coverage rather than risk being sued. 147 Cong
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expressed concern that holding plan sponsors to terms found outside
of the standard plan documents will lead to unpredictability and a
disincentive to provide employee benefit plans.'8 Obviously, a cause of
action that so threatens HIPAA's stated goal-to improve access to
healthcare-is antithetical to the statute's purpose. Allowing suits for
privacy-rule violations could conceivably open the floodgates of litiga-
tion and uncertainty, thereby driving up the costs of healthcare and
making employer-provided healthcare prohibitively expensive.
Use of privacy notices to determine terms of the plan may not,
however, actually implicate the legitimate concerns raised by other non-
plan documents. For instance, privacy notices are standard statutory
requirements, and thus their use as sources of terms of the plan is
unlikely to create uncertainty. On the contrary, the particular language
and formality of privacy notices may already induce plan participants to
rely upon them as binding terms of the plan. If so, courts may foster
unpredictability by not including their provisions as "terms of the plan."
Similarly, enforcement of HIPAA through ERISA does not give
rise to the difficulties that might inhere in an independent cause of ac-
tion for privacy violations under HIPAA itself. ERISA's statutory en-
forcement mechanism would provide broad but not limitless protection
for privacy-rule plaintiffs. Plaintiffs could bring suit against third parties
where "necessary to redress a violation of the terms of the Plan or to
enforce the Plan." '' The privacy rules do not cover all protected health
information usage, however, but only usage by specified covered enti-
ties,"' which excludes most small businesses that self-insure. ' Addition-
ally, § 502 specifies that only a "participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" of
an ERISA health plan may bring a private enforcement suit.9
Rec S 6837 (June 25,2001) (Senator Gregg) ("For the 56 million people who are covered by self-
insured plans ... the fact is, you can sue the employer.... [A] lot of employers are going to drop
their insurance so the people who have insurance today will not have it tomorrow.").
189 See, for example, Sprague v General Motors Corp, 133 F3d 388, 402 (6th Cir 1998) ("The
writing requirement ensures that every employee may, on examining the plan documents, deter-
mine exactly what his rights and obligations are under the plan.... [T]he requirement lends
predictability and certainty to employee benefit plans. [This] serves the interests of both employ-
ers and employees."); Gable v Sweetheart Cup Co, 35 F3d 851, 857 (4th Cir 1994) ("Were we to
hold that other communications could nullify this express written term, plan documents would
no longer serve to ensure predictability as to employers' future liabilities, and consequently,
substantial disincentives for even offering such plans would be created.") (internal quotation
marks omitted); Moore, 856 F2d at 492 (concluding that ERISA plans are not "subject to
amendment as a result of informal communications").
190 Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund v Comprehensive
Care Corp, 864 F Supp 831,833 (ND I11 994).
191 See 45 CFR § 164.500.
192 Covered entities essentially include all ERISA plans except those self-insured plans that are
administered by a sole employer and have fewer than fifty participants. See 45 CFR § 160.102.
193 29 USC § 1132(a)(3).
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Nor do HIPAA's required amendments and privacy notices in-
clude all possible privacy-rule rights or violations. The amendments to
plan documents relate only to how and when an employer can access
employee health information. Likewise, privacy notices restrict use
and disclosure of health information only with respect to the entity
giving notice and the individual receiving notice."' Moreover, addi-
tional relief would be limited to equitable relief; monetary relief
would be available only under very limited circumstances. ' Because
ERISA enforcement of the privacy rules would be restricted, there is
no reason to believe that such enforcement would result in disincen-
tives to provide employee benefit plans.
C. Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Another possible suit under ERISA § 502(a)(3) is a suit for
breach of fiduciary duty,", which would not require a finding that pri-
vacy notices constitute terms of the plan. The claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty is a hybrid of a relatively new statutory cause of action and
its former common-law incarnation. Although the Supreme Court has
held that suits for breach of fiduciary duty fall under the "catchall"
provision of § 502(a)(3), the lower courts have narrowly construed
that holding as applying only when a proper plaintiff has "no adequate
remedy elsewhere in ERISA's statutory framework."'7 Additionally,
courts continue to rely on their common law precedents to define
what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.'9 A breach
of fiduciary duty claim requires that a plaintiff prove more elements
than does a suit under the "terms of the plan."'"6
This Part will first discuss what a breach of fiduciary suit will look
like when plaintiffs rely on the privacy notice. Since not all ERISA
plans must produce privacy notices, this Part will next examine whether
a plaintiff can state a valid cause of action without relying on a privacy
194 See 45 CFR § 164.520(b)(ii).
195 Great-West, 534 US at 209, 213 (acknowledging that a sum of money might constitute
"appropriate equitable relief" in very limited circumstances, "where money or property identi-
fied as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or
property in the defendant's possession," but holding that money damages do not typically qualify
as equitable relief).
196 See Varity Corp, 516 US at 507-15 (interpreting § 502(a)(3) as providing appropriate
equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not address elsewhere, including
breach of fiduciary duty).
197 See Jones v American General Life and Accident Insurance Co, 370 F3d 1065, 1074 (11th
Cir 2004).
198 See, for example, id at 1072-74 (applying the common law of misrepresentation).
199 See text accompanying note 201.
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notice. Lastly, this Part considers whether a breach of fiduciary duty
claim exists whenever a fiduciary violates HIPAA regulations.
1. Relying on a privacy notice.
Many circuits have held that ERISA creates a federal cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty for providing inaccurate informa-
tion.2a If a plan has established and maintained a privacy notice and a
fiduciary refuses to honor those rights manifested in the notice, that
fiduciary may be liable for breach of fiduciary duty. Most courts re-
quire that plaintiffs in such cases show: "(1) that the defendant was
acting in a fiduciary capacity when it made the challenged representa-
tions; (2) that these constituted material misrepresentations; and (3)
that plaintiffs relied on those misrepresentations to their detriment. ' '...
Although Harris Trust and Savings Bank v Salomon Smith
Barney, Incm permits suits against certain nonfiduciaries for breach of
fiduciary dutym courts continue to require that defendants were act-
ing as fiduciaries when the misrepresentations were made.m  Even a
defendant who qualifies as a fiduciary under common law is an
ERISA fiduciary "only when fulfilling certain defined functions, in-
cluding the exercise of discretionary authority or control over plan
management or administration."'5 The decision to comply with
HIPAA regulations might be considered such an exercise of control
over plan administration.
The requirement of reasonable and detrimental reliance is a
stringent one. The Fourth Circuit requires, for instance, that the detri-
mental reliance "take the form of a definite and identifiable 
action '' 6
and has held that, "[s]pecifically, an estoppel arises when one person
makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having
200 See, for example, Drennan v General Motors Corp, 977 F2d 246, 251 (6th Cir 1992)
("Misleading communications to plan participants regarding plan administration (for example,
eligibility under a plan, the extent of benefits under a plan) will support a claim for a breach of
fiduciary duty.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
201 James v Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp, 305 F3d 439, 449 (6th Cir 2002) (holding that an
employer breached its fiduciary duty by providing materially misleading or inaccurate informa-
tion to employees about its pension/severance plan).
22 530 US 238 (2000).
203 See id at 246-47.
204 See Daniels v Thomas & Betts Corp, 263 F3d 66,73 (3rd Cir 2001) (stating that a plaintiff
must establish "the defendant's status as an ERISA fiduciary acting as fiduciary" in order to
make out one element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim); McMunn v Pirelli Tire, LLC, 161 F
Supp 2d 97, 125 (D Conn 2001). Acting like a fiduciary means having "authority to control and
manage the operation and administration of [a] plan." See 29 USC § 1102(a)(1).
205 Lockheed Corp v Spink, 517 US 882,890 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 Elmore v Cone Mills Corp, 187 F3d 442,446-47 (4th Cir 1999).
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reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and the other in rea-
sonable reliance does an act. ''2'
Although such reliance theoretically could consist merely of con-
tinuing to participate in the plan, the First Circuit has required that
the plaintiff rely "in such a manner as to change his position for the
worse."208 Since the privacy rules have been in effect for only a short
time, the great majority of ERISA participants have presumably en-
tered into their employment and plan participation without relying on
the rights and protections that the privacy rules afford. However, use
of certain benefits, such as an employee substance abuse program,
could constitute sufficient reliance on the plan's promise that the em-
ployer would not have access to that health information. Thus, the det-
rimental reliance requirement is demanding but not impossible to meet.
2. No privacy notice.
Even in the absence of a privacy notice, a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty for privacy-rule violations may exist under
ERISA § 409(a)."' Failure to comply with HIPAA's requirement that a
privacy notice be issued could constitute a. breach of fiduciary duty.
ERISA requires a fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries."2' Case
law on the subject is sparse; no court has determined whether a viola-
tion of a federal statute such as HIPAA qualifies as a breach of fiduci-
ary duty, apart from any misrepresentations made. However, misuse of
personal health information may be a breach of the duty to act "solely
in the interest of participants and beneficiaries 21' and, thus, a breach
of fiduciary duty.
CONCLUSION
ERISA § 502(a)(3) should provide a private cause of action to
enforce HIPAA's privacy rules as terms of the plan or for breach of
fiduciary duty for violations of those rules. Although commentators
and courts have almost uniformly concluded that HIPAA contains no
independent federal private cause of action for privacy-rule violations,
feasible private enforcement mechanisms exist under the enforcement
scheme of its fellow legislation, ERISA.
207 Id at 447 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
208 Law v Ernst & Young, 956 F2d 364, 368 (1st Cir 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209 29 USC § 1109(a)(1).
210 Id § 1104(a)(1).
211 Id.
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